A survey on the importance of respecting one another in society
Some draw from this the conclusion that respect is owed not to all but only to some human beings; others conclude that the obligation to respect all humans is groundless: rather than being grounded in some fact about humans, respect confers moral standing on them.
Yet another strategy is to reject the Kantian notion that there is but one kind or level of moral status or worth that warrants but one kind or level of respect.
This duty of recognition respect owed to others requires two things: first, that we adopt as a regulating policy a commitment to control our own desire to think well of ourselves this desire being the main cause of disrespectand, second, that we refrain from treating others in the following ways: treating them merely as means valuing them as less than ends in themselvesshowing contempt for them denying that they have any worthtreating them arrogantly demanding that they value us more highly than they value themselvesdefaming them by publicly exposing their faults, and ridiculing or mocking them.
As responsive, respect is object-generated rather than wholly subject-generated, something that is owed to, called for, deserved, elicited, or claimed by the object.
As the Categorical Imperative indicates, it is humanity in persons, strictly speaking, that has dignity; that is, it is in virtue of the humanity in them that people are and so ought to be treated as ends in themselves.
There is, finally, one further interesting relation between respect for the law and respect for persons.
How to show respect for other cultures
The idea of paying heed or giving proper attention to the object which is central to respect often means trying to see the object clearly, as it really is in its own right, and not seeing it solely through the filter of one's own desires and fears or likes and dislikes. Inherent in this acknowledgment is the necessity for educators to voice their awareness of how hard it can be to respect patients, particularly those from whom they are different. They maintain that there are moral contexts in which respect for persons is not an issue and that there are other dimensions of our moral relations with others that seem not to reduce to respect. Thus, appraisal respect is a matter of degree, depending on the extent to which the object meets the standards so, we can respect someone more or less highly and respect one person more highly than another , and it can co-exist with some negative assessments of an individual or her traits judged in light of other standards. Thus, we respect others as persons negatively by doing nothing to impair or destroy their capacity for autonomy, by not interfering with their autonomous decisions and their pursuit of morally acceptable the ends they value, and by not coercing or deceiving them or treating them paternalistically. At the same time, however, our awareness of the moral law involves a pleasurably uplifting feeling insofar as we recognize our own reason to be its only source. To protect the anonymity of contributors, we've removed their names and personal information from the essays. In modern philosophical discussions, humans are universally regarded as the paradigm objects of moral respect; if anything has moral standing or dignity and so warrants respect, it is the individual human being. For example, one can argue that rational nature is to be respected not only by respecting humanity in someone's person but also by respecting things that bear certain relations to rational nature, for example, by being fragments of it or necessary conditions of it. What makes you cringe? Rather, we respect an object for the reason that it has, in our judgment, some respect-warranting characteristic, that it is, in our view, the kind of object that calls for that kind of response Cranor ; but see Buss for disagreement. Moral standing, or moral considerability, is the idea that certain things matter morally in their own right and so are appropriate objects of direct fundamental moral consideration or concern Birch , P. Persons are just those beings who have the standing of authority to address demands to one another as persons. In addition to the debate between Kantian theory and utilitarianism, theoretical work has also been done in developing the role of respect for persons in Habermasian communicative ethics Young , Benhabib and in Aristotelian ethics Thompson , Fricke , Jacobs , in exploring similarities and differences between western Kantian views of respect for persons and Indian Ghosh-Dastidar , Confucian Lu , Chan , Wawrytko , and Taoist views Wong , and in developing a distinctively feminist account of respect for persons Farley , Dillon a. But it is also a standing or position from which claims or demands can be made.
Evaluative self-respect, in contrast, has to do with acquired worth, merit, based on the quality of one's character and conduct.
In everyday discourse, the valuing sense of respect, especially when used about people, most commonly means thinking highly of someone, i.
What is respect
So, self-respecting persons regard certain forms of acting, thinking, desiring, and feeling as befitting them as persons and other forms as self-debasing or shameful, and they expect themselves to adhere to the former and avoid the latter. This last kind also has political implications, as discussed below. To these three Kantian kinds of recognition self-respect we can add a fourth, which has to do with the fact that it is not just as abstract human beings or as agents with personal and universalizable moral goals and obligations that individuals can, do, or should respect themselves but also as concrete persons embedded in particular social structures and occupying various social positions with status-related responsibilities they must meet to be self-respecting Middleton The idea of respect for particularity and relationality has also become an important topic recently in political philosophy. In what follows, I will focus chiefly on respect as attitude or feeling. Some of these discussions aim to refine and develop Kant's account, while others criticize it and offer alternatives. Thus the morally worst persons have the same dignity as the morally best persons, although the former, we might say, fail to live up to their dignity. Some philosophers have argued that certain capacities fit the bill; others argue that there is no quality possessed by all humans that could be a plausible ground for a moral obligation of equal respect. As the way in which we are motivated to obey the moral law, reverential respect for the law is thus the way in which we are motivated to treat persons with recognition respect as the law commands us to do. There is, finally, one further interesting relation between respect for the law and respect for persons. You know how looking at a math problem similar to the one you're stuck on can help you get unstuck? The pain of such exclusion is proof of the value of participation in the labour market. It is striking, for instance, that US workers receiving an income boost from in-work tax credits become more likely to cast a vote, but not those who receive equivalent assistance through out-of-work benefits. These four forms of respect differ in several ways.
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